## IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA

In the matter of an application under and in terms of Article 140 of the Constitution for a Mandate in the nature of a Writ of Certiorari and Mandamus.

Theruviam Senarathrajah Ihala Hattiniya, Marawila.

<u>Petitioner</u>

CA (Writ)
Application No. 313/2016

- Vs -

- Indika Anurudda Piyadasa Divisional Secretary, Upper Division, Gampola
- L.K.G Gunawardena
   Commissioner General of Excise,
   Department of Excise,
   No. 34, W.A.D Ramanayake Mawatha,
   Colombo 02
- Muniyandi Prabakaran
   No. 2, Wahugapitiya,
   Gampola

And No.97R, Upper Division, Dumbaragiriya, Hatton Hon. Attorney General
 Attorney General's Department,
 Colombo 12

## **Respondents**

Before: C.P. Kirtisinghe – J

Mayadunne Corea – J

Counsel: Eraj De Silva, D. Wijeratne instructed by M/S Paul Ratnayake

Associates for the Petitioner

S. Wimalasena, SSC for the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> Respondents

M.T.N. Ahamed for the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent

Argued on: 25.11.2021 Decided on: 04.08.2022

## C.P. Kirtisinghe – J

Petitioner had filed this writ application seeking for a mandate in the nature of a Writ of Certiorari quashing the decision of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent – The Divisional Secretary, Upper Division, Gampola not to release the deposit of Rs.2,860,000.00 to the Petitioner, for a mandate in the nature of a Writ of Mandamus directing the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent to release the aforesaid deposit to the Petitioner and for the interim relief prayed for in the Petition.

On 21.09.2017 there had been a settlement entered between the Petitioner and the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent. A memorandum dated 18.09.2017 containing the contents of the settlement had been tendered to Court. According to the contents of that memorandum and according to the terms of settlement recorded by Court on 21.09.2017 it has been recorded that the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent has no objection in releasing the deposit of Rs. 2,860,000.00 held by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent with interest accrued to the Petitioner by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent had agreed to withdraw the appeal bearing no. FA/115/16 filed in the Civil Appellate High Court of Kandy against the order made in case no. SPL/58/2011 in DC Gampola and the Petitioner had agreed not to execute the Writ against the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent in DC Gampola case no. SPL/58/2011. On 26.03.2019 the 3<sup>rd</sup>

Respondent has tendered an affidavit stating that he had never given instructions to his Registered Attorney – at – Law to settle the case in any manner whatsoever before this Court. He says that his Registered Attorney- at - Law had requested for the signature of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent to a document a few minutes prior to the calling of the case in Court on that day. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent says that his knowledge in English is limited to placing his signature in English and the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent had signed the document on the understanding that it was a document that has to be submitted on his behalf for the purpose of objecting to the Petitioner's application. He further states that the contents of the said document were not read over and explained to him. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent states that he is not agreeable to the aforesaid terms of settlement. After about one month's time he became aware of the terms of settlement and requested his Registered Attorney – at – Law to bring to the notice of Court of his disagreement but the Registered Attorney had not acted accordingly. On 05.09.2018, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent had tendered an Affidavit to Court and informed Court that he is objecting to the aforesaid terms of settlement being accepted and requested for an order accordingly. In this Affidavit, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent says that he is not inclined to proceed with the settlement and he will be withdrawing from the aforesaid terms of settlement.

The Petitioner had filed a statement of objections to the application of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent and states that at all material times, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent knew and understood the contents of the said motion and in fact the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent acted on the contents of the motion. Prior to this motion, the parties signed a document containing the identical terms of settlement at the office of the Lawyers of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent (Document marked B).

The Petitioner states that the conduct of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent amounts to a contempt of court. Therefore, the Petitioner had prayed for a dismissal of the application of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent and prays that this Court should hold that the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent had committed an act of contempt of court and punish the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent accordingly.

It is the case of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent that he signed the aforesaid memorandum with the mistaken belief that he was signing a document for the purpose of objecting to the Petitioner's writ application and he never knew that he was consenting to the aforementioned settlement. So, he says that he had signed it by 'mistake'.

Chitaley and Rao in "Commentary on the Code of Civil Procedure" 1908, 7<sup>th</sup> Edition - Volume III (1963) at pages 3509-3510 state thus:-

"A compromise decree is but a contract with the command of a Judge superadded to it....It can, therefore, be set aside on any of the grounds, such as fraud, mistake, misrepresentation, etc., on which a contract may be set aside".

This view was followed by Soza J in the case of **Ceylon Carriers LTD v Peiris (1981) 2 SLR 119**. In that case, Soza J regarded a settlement of this nature upon which a decree is entered under Section 408 of the Civil Procedure Code to be in substance a contract to which is superadded the command of the Judge. This view was followed also in the case of **Gunasekara v Leelawathie (Sri Kantha Law Reports Vol V - Page 139)**.

In the case of **Dassanayake v Dassanayake 30 NLR 385** it was held that when an application is made to have an adjustment or compromise of an action entered under Section 408 of the Civil Procedure Code, it must be clearly established that both parties have agreed to the compromise and that effect could be given to it by a decree of Court. In the case of **Cornelius Perera v Leo Perera 62 NLR 413**, it was held that on the ground of mistake, the consent order and the judgment based on it can be set aside.

The memorandum submitted to Court marked 'A' has been signed by the Petitioner and the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent has also signed a similar document marked 'B'. Both those documents contain the same terms of settlement. However, the Petitioner had not signed the document 'B'. Instead, an agent of the Petitioner had signed the document. The Petitioner in his affidavit states that the memorandum tendered to Court was signed by the parties at the office of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent's Attorney-at-Law which means the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent had signed it inside his Lawyer's office. But the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent says that he signed the memorandum outside the courthouse just before the case was taken up indicating that he signed it hurriedly.

When you compare document 'A' with document 'B', both documents contain the signature of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent. Only 'A' contains the signature of the Petitioner and 'B' had been signed by the agent of the Petitioner. Therefore, it is clear that the two documents had been signed on two different occasions and the Petitioner was not there when 'B' was signed. But the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent had been present on both those occasions. Therefore, the Petitioner's version to the effect that the memorandum tendered to Court was signed at the office of the

3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent's Attorney-at-Law is more probable and one cannot accept the version of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent that it was signed outside the courthouse just before the case was taken up. As the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent had signed 2 documents containing the same terms of settlement on two occasions, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent had the ample opportunity of perusing the terms of settlement twice without any hurry. Further, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent had signed those documents in English and his handwriting is mature. Therefore, one cannot accept that he had no sufficient knowledge of English to understand the terms of settlement. Therefore, one cannot accept the version of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent that he signed the memorandum by mistake.

The Petitioner says that the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent withdrew the Appeal he had lodged in the High Court (Civil) Kandy acting in terms of the settlement but there is no evidence before us to that effect. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent states that he became aware of the terms of settlement one month after signing it. But he had not made any attempt to bring this matter to the notice of this Court until the expiration of a period of nearly one year from that date. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent says that he instructed his Attorney-at-Law to do so but his Registered Attorney had not acted according to his instructions. If it was the case, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent should have revoked the proxy and retained the services of a new Registered Attorney-at-Law. But the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent has failed to act in that manner. That shows that the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent did not make any attempt to resile from the settlement until the expiration of nearly one year from the date of the settlement which means that the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent not only accepted the said terms of settlement, but he was also acting in terms of the settlement. Therefore, one cannot accept the fact that the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent signed the aforesaid memorandum by mistake.

In the case of **Sinna Veloo v Messrs Lipton LTD 66 NLR 214**, Herath J held that once the terms of settlement as agreed upon are presented to Court and notified thereto and recorded by Court, a party cannot resile from the settlement. It was further held that when parties to an action enter into a settlement and are represented by their Proctors, they need not be personally present when the settlement is notified to the Court. Therefore, a Registered Attorney-at-Law can enter into a settlement on behalf of his client in the absence of the client.

In the case of **Mohideen Ali v Hassim 62 NLR 457**, it was argued in Appeal that the authority of the Proctor of a party to a suit was limited by the terms of the

instrument of appointment and that as Section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code provided that an Advocate instructed by a Proctor represents the Proctor in Court, the Advocate's authority could never be greater than that given to the Proctor. It was held that despite the restricted terms of the proxy, the Plaintiff was entitled to judgment in his favor in terms of the consent given by the Defendant's Counsel. An extension of the written authority contained in the proxy could be given orally or be inferred from the client's conduct.

In the case of Ummu Vareela Majumdeen v Keerthi (C.A.L.A 119/2002, DC Kandy 16327/L, C.A. Minutes dated 18.06.2004), the Plaintiff instituted the action to eject both the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Defendants from the premises in suit. Case was settled in between the Plaintiff and the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant in the absence of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Defendant. But the Attorney-at-Law who appeared for the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant held a common proxy given by both Defendants. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Defendant later made an Application through another Attorney-at-Law to have a declaration that he was not bound by the consent decree for the reason that he was not informed about the settlement. The District Judge held that the 2<sup>nd</sup> Defendant was not bound by the settlement.

## Gamini Amaratunga J held thus:-

"The compromise entered into without any objection from the Attorney-at-Law was equally binding on the  $2^{nd}$  Defendant on the basis of the general authority conferred by the proxy".

The 3<sup>rd</sup> Defendant does not deny the fact that his signature is contained in the memorandum. His case is that he signed it on a mistaken belief. Therefore, the signature is admitted.

In the English case of **L'Estrange v F. Graucob LTD [1934] 2 KB 394**, Scrutton LJ (with Maugham LJ agreeing) held that as a buyer had signed the written contract and had not been induced to do so by any misrepresentation, she was bound by the terms of the contract, and it was wholly immaterial that she had not read it and did not know its contents.

As the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent had signed this memorandum containing the terms of settlement, it is immaterial that he had not read and did not know its contents. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent is bound by the contents of the memorandum.

For the reasons I have stated earlier, in the circumstances of this case one can come to the conclusion that the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent had the opportunity of reading

it before signing and had the opportunity of understanding the contents. At the time the memorandum was tendered to Court and the settlement was entered, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent had the assistance of a Counsel and his Registered Attorneyat-Law and he was represented by a President's Counsel. Therefore, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent cannot complain that he had no knowledge of the contents of the memorandum. Therefore, I hold that the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent is bound by the terms and conditions contained in the aforesaid memorandum and the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent cannot resile from that settlement.

For the aforesaid reasons, I dismiss the application of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent.

Judge of the Court of Appeal

Mayadunne Corea – J I agree

Judge of the Court of Appeal